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LIBERTY’S LIMITS & EDITING HUMANITY* 
ALEXANDRA L. FOULKES** 
Any debate about the effects of Lawrence v. Texas on American society 
notwithstanding, the Court’s opinion is a landmark in its own right. Lawrence’s 
logic placed an indelible mark on the Constitution’s central—though certainly 
elusive—protections of liberty. Particularly after Lawrence, substantive due 
process might amount to something beyond the sum of its parts. By defining 
liberty not merely as a collection of disconnected rights, but as a larger whole, 
Lawrence invites a more flexible substantive due process analysis. The 
foreseeable consequence of this flexible approach in fact manifested. Justice 
Scalia’s vision of Lawrence—that the decision would lead to a flood of litigation 
in the lower courts—materialized, at least to some extent, with litigants 
advocating for the recognition of new fundamental rights. But even Justice 
Scalia would never have included in his parade of horribles the most recent effort 
to expand liberty’s definition: a call for the recognition of a fundamental right to 
edit humanity. The argument for a fundamental right to edit humanity stems 
from the Court’s jurisprudence on procreative, parental, and privacy rights. The 
flexible language in Lawrence, too, lends its support. This Article asserts that a 
fundamental right to edit humanity should not be recognized. While not 
necessarily inconsistent with precedent, the arguments for the right to engage in 
therapeutic germline genome editing do not flow naturally from the Court’s 
previous holdings. Further, entitling parents to use GGE also poses 
insurmountable practical and policy-based obstacles. Most poignantly, the line-
drawing method that has been proposed will prove intractable. And, in any case, 
our legislative and executive branches of government are far better positioned to 
handle the issues raised by germline genome editing than the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his article, Editing Humanity, Dr. Paul Enríquez makes an important 
contribution to a long line of scholarship on the constitutional implications of 
reproductive technologies.1 Enríquez’s piece is the first to deal with the 
 
 1. See Paul Enríquez, Editing Humanity: On the Precise Manipulation of DNA in Human Embryos, 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019). Enríquez is not the first to look to the constitutional implications of these 
technologies. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: 
Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1285–91 (1986) (laying 
out arguments for and against a fundamental right to genetic engineering of positive traits or 
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development of CRISPR-Cas9 technologies in this context. Through CRISPR, 
previously impossible feats in genetic engineering have become imminent 
realities.2 Chinese scientists have successfully modified the genomes of human 
embryos—repeatedly.3 These ventures into germline genome editing (“GGE”), 
coupled with ominous lessons from history and significant gaps in our 
understanding of the safety of CRISPR applications, have spurred protective 
legislation. In fact, Enríquez argues that current legislative and administrative 
regulations in the United States form a de facto legal ban on GGE clinical 
applications.4 And he suggests that this ban amounts to an unconstitutional 
intrusion on individual liberties.5 Enríquez argues for the existence of a 
fundamental right that extends to protect the parent’s decision to edit out 
certain genetic conditions in her offspring. 
In response to Enríquez, I argue that a fundamental right to edit humanity 
should not be recognized. While not necessarily inconsistent with precedent, 
the arguments for the right to engage in therapeutic GGE don’t flow naturally 
from the United States Supreme Court’s previous holdings. In addition to 
doctrinal questions about the scope of fundamental rights, entitling parents to 
use GGE also poses practical and policy-based obstacles. 
Part I of this Article begins with a layout of the relevant constitutional 
doctrine and Enríquez’s argument before further developing the argument for 
a fundamental right to GGE. Part II addresses the weaknesses in the argument 
for a fundamental right to GGE. Finally, Part III turns to policy-based 
arguments against recognizing the right. 
I.  PROPOSED ARGUMENTS AND FRAMEWORK FOR GGE AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments promise refuge from 
government-sanctioned deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”6 Exactly what constitutes an invasion of liberty as protected by 
the Due Process Clause, however, isn’t so clear. 
 
enhancements). But as Professor Attanasio noted, in grappling with these issues “individual genetic 
breakthroughs must be examined on their own merits.” Id. at 1342. 
 2. CRISPR stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. For an 
explanation of the science, see Alexandra L. Foulkes et al., Legal and Ethical Implications of CRISPR 
Applications in Psychiatry, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1359, 1363–65 (2019). 
 3. David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-
human-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/CYG4-QC8F]. 
 4. See Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1162. 
 5. Id. at 1240. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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A. Attempts To Establish GGE as a Fundamental Right 
The precise contours of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
are not subject to being “reduced to any formula.”7 The Court’s existing privacy 
jurisprudence, however, provides guideposts for understanding GGE as a 
fundamental right. 
1.  Doctrinal Foundation: Family, Reproduction, and Parental Choices 
Meyer v. Nebraska8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters9 are perhaps the two 
sturdiest guideposts, foundational to a modern understanding of substantive 
due process doctrine.10 The Court in these cases was concerned with protecting 
a parent’s authority to make basic choices about her children’s upbringing.11 To 
be sure, the issues in both Meyer and Pierce are narrow. In Meyer, the Court held 
that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of certain languages in public 
schools was unconstitutional, unreasonably depriving parents of liberty without 
due process of law.12 Similarly, in Pierce, the Court found that the state-
compelled attendance of children at public schools unreasonably interfered with 
a parent’s interests in directing the rearing of her offspring.13 Despite their 
narrow holdings, the language in these decisions included broad statements 
about liberty’s substantive reach.14 The Court has subsequently declined to 
describe the rights that Meyer and Pierce protect as discrete, enumerable private 
activities.15 Rather, what these precedents establish is how certain parenting 
decisions fall along the continuum of moral choice and personal autonomy 
central to the constitutionally protected realm of liberty.16 
 
 7. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Andrew B. Coan, Is There 
a Constitutional Right To Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 238 (2011) (“[T]he 
scope of the constitutional right to procreative liberty and the extent of its application to genetic-
selection decisions is, in a nutshell, unclear.”). 
 8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 10. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1934 (2004). 
 11. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399–400 (1923). 
 12. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. 
 13. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 14. See id. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 15. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 1934–35. 
 16. See Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. 275, 277 (2014). Meyer and Pierce are Supreme Court decisions handed down during the infamous 
Lochner era. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy which many later 
opinions repudiated.”). 
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The Court’s later decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut17 and Eisenstadt v. 
Baird18 bring this point into focus. In Griswold, the Court invalidated a state law 
that barred the distribution and use of contraceptives.19 Eisenstadt extended the 
holding in Griswold beyond the marital relationship.20 Both opinions describe 
the identified right as “the right of privacy”21 and conclude that “it is the right 
of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to the decision whether to beget 
a child.”22 
Griswold and Eisenstadt formed the background against which Roe v. 
Wade23 was decided. In Roe, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
Texas statute prohibiting abortion.24 Roe revalidated the existence of a 
fundamental right to privacy.25 It held that this right is implicated when a 
woman decides whether to obtain an abortion because becoming a mother may 
place a heavy burden on the woman.26 And given that carrying an unintended 
or unwanted pregnancy to term might pose severe and imminent harm to the 
individual decisionmaker, the state’s ability to restrict her decisionmaking 
capacity in this context should be limited.27 
Importantly, however, the Court in Roe emphasized that the woman’s 
right is not absolute.28 This understanding of Roe’s holding was later bolstered 
by Carey v. Population Services International,29 where the Court struck down a 
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors by relying on 
Griswold’s and Eisenstadt’s logic.30 In Carey, the Court explained that an aspect 
of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included the guarantee 
of certain zones of privacy, encompassing the “interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions.”31 The Court was concerned with 
guarding decisionmaking autonomy in personal choices “relating to marriage, 
 
 17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 20. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 21. Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 22. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 24. Id. at 117–18. 
 25. Id. at 152. 
 26. Id. at 152–53. 
 27. Id. at 153. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 30. Id. at 685. 
 31. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1992) (stating that Eisenstadt, Griswold, and Carey “involve personal 
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect 
for it”). 
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procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education” because the consequences of these decisions so fundamentally affect 
a person.32 
Finally, through Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas,33 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy.34 The focus of the inquiry in Lawrence was not—as it had 
been in Bowers v. Hardwick35—whether the petitioners had a fundamental right 
to engage in homosexual sodomy.36 Rather, the Court looked to how the state 
had chosen to apportion decisionmaking roles in the context at hand. The Court 
assessed the allocations’ constitutionality, looking to how, through these 
divisions, the state had involved itself in the petitioners’ choices on the 
relationships they sought to form or the people they wanted to be.37 
2.  Applying the Doctrine to GGE for Therapeutic Uses 
a. The Argument for GGE in the CRISPR Context 
Enríquez’s argument focuses on a narrow category of applications: the use 
of GGE for health and therapeutic purposes.38 Enríquez argues that a person’s 
decision whether to become a parent is likely to be affected by the knowledge 
that she is a carrier of a genetic mutation for a serious genetic disease.39 And, 
certainly, the Supreme Court has noted that “[i]f the right to privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into the matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”40 If the parent is left to choose 
between no child and a child destined to live a life of disease, likely to end in 
premature death, then the recognized right to procreate might be undermined.41 
The congenital disease of a child may impose on his mother a “distressful life 
and future.”42 Just as Roe recognized, “Psychological harm may be imminent, 
[and the parent’s] mental and physical health may be taxed by childcare.”43 
 
 32. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684–85 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (1973)). 
 33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 34. Id. at 578.  
 35. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a Georgia sodomy law, neutral on its face, and upheld the law finding no constitutional violations. 
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 186, 196 (1986). 
 37. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 1931. 
 38. See Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1226. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Enríquez, supra note 
1, at 1220–21. 
 41. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1221 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942)). 
 42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 43. Enríquez. supra note 1, at 1221. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).   
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Enríquez identifies many of the important connections. Though, it is worth 
considering how the argument for GGE can be strengthened before assessing 
whether it is sufficiently convincing. 
b. Strengthening the Argument for GGE 
Roe deserves more attention because, in the GGE context, like in Roe, the 
centrality of the parent’s decision is key. The decision to edit out disease in her 
child is central to her parental autonomy and, as such, points beyond superficial 
connections to the discrete, property-like rights identified in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma,44 Eisenstadt, and Roe—relics reminiscent of the Lochner area.45 It’s not 
that a new right to use GGE for therapeutic purposes should be listed after the 
right to procreate,46 or the right of a pregnant woman to terminate a 
pregnancy,47 in a catalogue of “unenumerated” liberties. Rather, it is arguable 
that the same thread that connected Lawrence to Casey, to Roe, to Griswold, and 
the rest reaches the decision of a parent to use GGE to remedy a child’s serious 
genetic condition. That is, the idea that the fundamental right to privacy 
protects decisions impacting the parent’s choice to form the relationships she 
wants to form or be the person she wants to be. The right at issue is the right 
to privacy, against government interference, to make decisions central to 
personal autonomy—namely the decision to edit out genetic defect in an 
offspring. 
i.  The Decision to Engage in GGE & Relationships 
The relationship between a parent and child is one through which a parent 
develops a part of herself.48 Unlike a marital relationship, the parent-child 
relationship is timeless and often becomes more life-altering than marriage.49 
Hence, the right to privacy, affording protection to the individual to marry 
without race- or sex-based restrictions,50 might imply some right to enter into a 
parent-child relationship unencumbered by burdensome genetic conditions.51 
The Court has recognized how controlling the formation of children is 
central to parental autonomy.52 It’s clear that the choice to have one’s children 
 
 44. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 45. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
 46. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
 47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 48. See MIRIAM GALPER COHEN, LONG-DISTANCE PARENTING 21 (1989) (“Without that 
connection, both parents and children fail to develop a part of themselves.”). 
 49. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1223. 
 50. The decision to marry is constitutionally protected, at least to some extent. See Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 51. See Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit 
Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 427 (2003). 
 52. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
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learn German is central enough to the formation of parental autonomy to 
deserve constitutional protection.53 So is the decision to have one’s child attend 
private school.54 As such, the centrality of a decision to rid one’s child of serious 
genetic disease arguably follows a fortiori. The consequences of the latter for 
the responsible parent are far more severe: the burden placed on a parent as a 
result of having a diseased child is arguably far greater than the burden of having 
a child who doesn’t speak German. And Roe teaches us that the weight of this 
burden—the imminent psychological harms and physical tax on the parent—is 
instructive as to the centrality of the parent’s decision.55 
ii.  Conceptualizing the Parent’s Harm: Wrongful Birth Claims 
Wrongful birth claims, which are rare but recognized in a number of 
jurisdictions,56 conceptualize a child’s genetic disease as the parent’s injury.57 
These claims arise when a parent sues a medical professional arguing that 
genetic defects, negligently undetected by the diagnostician, manifested in her 
child.58 As such, the parent was deprived of the legal opportunity to terminate 
the pregnancy.59 The woman can then sue for damages for pain and suffering, 
the cost of the child’s treatment, and other related expenses.60 These cases 
demonstrate that the harm springing from a genetically “defective” child 
accrues to the mother. It’s the loss of her constitutionally guaranteed right to 
make decisions central to the formation of familial relationships. 
iii.  The (Nonexistent) Child’s (Nonexistence) Harm 
On the other hand, wrongful life claims are generally barred. Here, the 
child with the genetic condition sues, arguing he never should have been born.61 
Most courts justify their refusal to recognize wrongful life claims by noting how 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 56. See Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right To Refuse 
Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All But One, 64 MO. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999). 
 57. Mara C. Bottis, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 11 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 55, 55 (2004). 
 58. See Strasser, supra note 56, at 30. 
 59. See, e.g., Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 2017) 
(recognizing that a mother and father had cognizable cause of action for child’s wrongful birth). 
 60. Id. at 399–403 (noting that “a majority of states recognize wrongful-birth claims [and] [a]t 
least twenty-three states recognize the claim by judicial decision,” and describing the compensable 
injury to the parent); see Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see 
also Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 (Md. 2002) (“[T]he parents of the child could sue the 
doctor for the expense of raising the unplanned child during her minority, reduced by the value of the 
benefits conferred to them by having the child.” (citing Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md. 
1984))). 
 61. It seems all but two jurisdictions, New Jersey and Washington, have rejected these claims. See 
Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 403 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 
656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983). 
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impossible it is to conceptualize the claimant’s harm: “The infant plaintiff 
would have us measure the difference between his life with defects against the 
utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determination.”62 
Implicitly, a majority of courts have recognized that the “Nonidentity Problem” 
limits wrongful life claims.63 
The Nonidentity Problem posits that it’s wrong to say that a child has 
been harmed by being brought into existence, so long as that child has been 
given a life worth living.64 A life not worth living is a life so devoid of anything 
good, and so filled with suffering, that the individual would be better off never 
to have existed at all.65 The Nonidentity Problem reinforces the 
conceptualization of the harm generated by the birth of a genetically defective 
child as the parent’s harm alone. 
iv.  A Negative Right, Deeply Rooted in History 
To recognize a fundamental right to GGE, one need not rely on “abstract 
concepts of personal autonomy,”66 at least no more abstract than those concepts 
already deemed worthy of protection by the Court. If we accept what has been 
laid out above, it follows that there already exists a concrete right to privacy 
deeply rooted in our nation’s history that extends to cover the decision to edit 
a child’s genome. 
The right can be conceptualized as a right against unwanted intrusion as 
opposed to a positive claim to access.67 The claim is in the negative: to keep the 
government from usurping a parent’s decisionmaking authority on matters so 
central to the development of the parent-child relationship, and hence to the 
development of the parent’s self. In the context of relationships, to act privately 
is not to act in isolation. Rather it is to act autonomously, free from government 
interference.68 
B. The Proposed Policy Framework for Future GGE 
Enríquez’s constitutional claim for a fundamental right to engage in 
selective uses of GGE is a narrow one. Enríquez proposes a legal- and science-
based normative framework, in an attempt to draw clean lines that distinguish 
 
 62. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).  
 63. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Best Interests]. 
 64. Id. at 1208. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (noting that when recognizing a right 
deeply rooted in our nation’s history the Court will not rely on “abstract concepts of personal 
autonomy”). 
 67. Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would You Like Blue Eyes with That? A Fundamental Right to Genetic 
Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 757 (2017). 
 68. Id. at 758. 
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between permissible and impermissible GGE applications.69 He identifies four 
distinct purposes for which parents might want to use GGE: (1) health and 
therapeutic uses to remedy disease; (2) prophylactic purposes, only some of 
which may be therapeutic in nature; (3) cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and 
(4) modification of special traits for which the law affords certain protections.70 
Enríquez claims editing in the first category is a fundamental right.71 
Category 1 interventions, according to Enríquez, target only monogenic 
diseases—generally life-long and debilitating conditions for which the science 
is well understood.72 Conversely, Enríquez asserts that uses that fall into the 
fourth category are constitutionally prohibited, as they create a likelihood of 
discrimination against specific groups. Enríquez acknowledges that Category 4 
interventions are unlikely to be real clinical possibilities soon.73 
Enríquez recognizes that distinguishing between the first and second 
categories poses a challenge. As he acknowledges, prophylactic interventions, or 
Category 2 uses, share a lot of characteristics with Category 1 interventions, and 
the precise point at which disease or disability begins is hard to define.74 
Enríquez’s argument seeks to avoid this line-drawing problem by limiting 
Category 1—and thus constitutional protections—to mostly monogenic diseases 
and not polygenic conditions.75 Enriquez chooses to draw the line between 
Category 1 and Category 2 at monogenic and polygenic because CRISPR’s most 
attractive therapeutic targets at this time are monogenic conditions.76 
But drawing the line at monogenic/polygenic, however, seems irrelevant 
to the fundamental rights analysis. The distinction may certainly be key to an 
analysis of the government’s interest in regulating GGE, as Enríquez indicates. 
The government’s interest in regulating GGE might shift over time as science 
understands more clearly how to apply GGE to polygenic conditions. But if 
there is a fundamental right to use GGE on one’s children to remedy disease, it 
seems arbitrary for the existence of the right to turn on how well experts 
understand the science of certain conditions today. It is the decision to engage 
in GGE to remedy disease—independent of the disease’s genetic profile—that 
leads to consequences so fundamentally affecting a person that government 
interference shouldn’t be tolerated. This is so even if the definition of disease 
might change over time. There is precedent in Roe showing how using 
technology as a benchmark might turn out to be a bad idea: “The Roe 
 
 69. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1219. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1219–20. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1235. 
 74. Id. at 1226. 
 75. See id. at 1220. 
 76. Id. at 1220 n.398. Monogenic conditions involve or control a single gene. Polygenic conditions 
involve more than one gene. Id. at 1220 nn.396–97. 
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framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. As medical science 
becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point 
of viability is moved further back toward conception.”77 
I argue that the framework for deciding when a government’s interest 
might be strong enough to survive strict scrutiny cannot be relevant to the 
analysis of whether the right exists in the first place. Below, I’ll show that the 
available jurisprudence does not support finding a fundamental right in this 
context, at all. 
II.  BEYOND LIBERTY’S REACH: A COUNTERARGUMENT TO GGE AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The argument for GGE relies on an expansive reading of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.78 The Court’s opinion in Lawrence certainly left open the 
possibility of conceptualizing liberty as the regression line that explains all of 
the data points plotted by the Court in Meyer, Pierce, Roe, and the rest. But 
Lawrence drew no such line. The Court in Lawrence recognized no new 
fundamental right, nor did the Court explicitly recognize that the decisions at 
issue in Lawrence fell within the protected privacy sphere.79 
Such a broad understanding of the Constitution’s guarantees is in tension 
with the Court’s own statements warning that its line of substantive due process 
cases won’t justify a “sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, 
and personal decisions are so protected.”80 To understand which decisions fit 
the modern substantive due process trend, there must be some limiting 
principle beyond the fact that the decision at issue is of the same kind as those 
involved in earlier fundamental rights cases. This section will turn first to 
Glucksberg and then to Lawrence in search of possible limitations. I will then 
consider competing interests implicated in the Court’s decisions on parental 
autonomy as a limiting principle, suggesting that a right to use GGE for 
therapeutic purposes likely falls outside of liberty’s substantive reach. 
A. Doctrinal Deficiencies: Glucksberg’s and Lawrence’s Limitations 
Certainly, the argument in Part II above has identified the necessary 
prerequisite that fundamental decisions be intimate, personal, and of central 
importance. And the argument for GGE shows that the necessary prerequisite 
 
 77. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abrogating Roe’s 
trimester system based on the viability of the child). 
 78. See Ossareh, supra note 67, at 730. 
 79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). The Court decided the case by stating that 
Texas failed to meet the requirements of rational basis scrutiny. Id. 
 80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997). 
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has been met. But the argument fails to account for the likelihood that this 
condition, while necessary, is not sufficient. 
1.  A Right Too Broad with Roots Too Shallow 
Perhaps the relevant limiting principle can be found in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, where the Court unanimously identified two constraints for 
recognizing fundamental rights.81 To avoid having to recognize the broadly 
framed “right to die,” which might have been easily transmuted into a right 
encompassing a slew of choices about how and when to end one’s life,82 
Glucksberg required that: (1) the right asserted be deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and that (2) it be carefully defined.83 This was so despite the fact that 
the issue in Glucksberg shared underlying commonalities with the Court’s 
substantive due process precedent in Roe and the rest. The decision, after all, 
involved control over one’s own bodily integrity.84 In other words, Glucksberg 
recognized that although the choice at issue was, in one sense, of the same kind 
as those that the Court had recognized as fundamental, that alone was not 
enough to guarantee constitutional protection. 
a. Overbroad, Subjective, and Discretionary 
The argument for recognizing therapeutic GGE as a fundamental right 
claims that there is a deeply rooted history for the right to privacy to make 
decisions central to personal autonomy, and that the decision to edit out genetic 
defects in an offspring is then encompassed by that right to privacy.85 
Glucksberg’s first prong is thereby met by virtue of the fact that the deep 
historical roots that existed to support Meyer then grew deeper as the Court 
decided Pierce, Griswold, Roe, and Casey. But framing the right broadly as the 
right to privacy (against government interference) to make decisions central to 
personal autonomy, namely the decision to edit out genetic defects in an 
offspring, leads to intractable line drawing. 
The right to use GGE is primarily rooted in the burden that’s placed on 
the parent by virtue of giving birth to a “diseased” child or by having to risk 
conceiving a “diseased” child.86 The weight of this burden, as Roe instructs, is 
what makes the decision to use GGE central to parental autonomy. That weight 
might be subjective, as it appears to be conceptualized in Roe: this particular 
 
 81. Id. at 719. 
 82. Id. at 709. 
 83. See id. at 720–21. I’ll refer to these two limitations as Glucksberg’s first and second prongs 
respectively. 
 84. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1517, 1528 (2008). 
 85. See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text. 
 86. I’m using scare quotes here to emphasize that the term “diseased,” like the term “normal,” is 
loaded. Cohen, Best Interests, supra note 63, at 1226. 
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woman, in her individual circumstances, might be so physically burdened by 
becoming a mother that the weight of the burden becomes intolerable.87 If so, 
whether a condition is monogenic or polygenic—or, for that matter, whether 
the GGE is targeted at treatment or enhancement—would be irrelevant. The 
question becomes whether having a particular child would place such a burden 
on the mother so as to make the GGE decision central and thereby so 
fundamentally important as to warrant staving off government interference.88 
The line drawn at genetic disease in the argument above becomes unworkable. 
For example, let’s imagine a mother with achondroplasia who wants her 
child to share in her experience.89 Her partner also has achondroplasia, and so, 
without intervention, their chances of having a child without achondroplasia are 
25%.90 For her, that’s too risky. The mother’s house, vehicle, and workplace 
have been modified to accommodate her different capacities. And living with 
achondroplasia has shaped a significant part of her identity. To her, having a 
child without achondroplasia would be physically and emotionally burdensome. 
She feels ill-equipped to raise a person without achondroplasia. The mother 
can’t bear the thought of never having a child with achondroplasia with whom 
to share her experience. Ultimately, without having raised such a child, she’ll 
fail to develop a part of herself. According to the argument for GGE above, this 
mother’s access to the technology should be constitutionally protected, even 
though society will view her child with achondroplasia as “diseased.”91 
What if the burden is a more objective one, as Enríquez proposes, limiting 
the use of GGE for conditions society considers to be genetic diseases at the 
time of intervention? Then, there’s an overbreadth problem, both because at 
one point in time society may view a condition as a disability and later come to 
see that same expression as diversity, and also because at any given point in 
time it may be hard to determine exactly what conditions society considers 
burdensome. This ambiguity all derives from the fact that the line between 
diversity and disability simply is not clear.92 
We can begin our discussion on society’s inability to cleanly differentiate 
between disability and disease with Fragile X syndrome. Fragile X syndrome, 
 
 87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 88. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Elyse W. Gant, Note, Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Reproductive Technologies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 
1009 (2010). 
 89. This illustration isn’t much of a hypothetical. See ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE 
TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 149 (2012). People with 
achondroplasia are also known as “little people.” Frequently Asked Questions, LITTLE PEOPLE AM., 
https://www.lpaonline.org/faq-#Gene [https://perma.cc/Q23A-VTPX]. 
 90. The genetics and inheritance patterns of achondroplasia are relatively well understood. 
Learning About Achondroplasia, NAT’L. HUM. GENOME RES. INST. https://www.genome.gov/
19517823/learning-about-achondroplasia/ [https://perma.cc/GFA8-QGSB]. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See Foulkes et al., supra note 2, at 1396. 
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which is a monogenic condition likely to be a target of CRISPR intervention in 
the near future,93 is thought to be the most commonly inherited form of 
intellectual disability.94 Fragile X causes developmental abnormalities in the 
brain that are thought to lead to severe autism-like symptoms.95 But those 
diagnosed with Fragile X may go on to form meaningful relationships and live 
fruitful lives.96 And some have claimed that neurodiversity, or the idea that 
certain “cognitive impairments” are a part of the normal spectrum of diversity, 
should extend to include autism-like symptoms.97 
Though we may not understand the genetic architecture of sexuality well 
enough to make it a target of CRISPR intervention today,98 sexuality 
nevertheless serves as a poignant reminder of how the line between disease and 
disability is fluid. Its history serves as a cautionary tale for how unregulated 
uses of GGE might not be a good idea, even if they are limited to what—in this 
moment in time—society considers therapeutic uses. I acknowledge that 
Enríquez proposes that this category should be protected.99 But my point is that 
not too long ago, a parent would have considered a homosexual child to be 
“diseased.” It was not until 1992 that the World Health Organization stopped 
classifying homosexuality as a disease.100 And to date, the American Psychiatric 
Association categorizes gender dysphoria as a disease, the treatment of which—
in some cases—comes to requires serious medical intervention.101 Gender 
dysphoria and homosexuality are both linked disproportionately to premature 
death.102 
 
 93. Id. at 1376. 
 94. X. Shawn Liu et al., Rescue of Fragile X Syndrome Neurons by DNA Methylation Editing of the 
FMR1 Gene, 172 CELL 979, 979 (2018). 
 95. Dejan B. Budimirovic, Fragile X Syndrome and Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Similarities and 
Differences Between FXS and ASD, NAT’L FRAGILE X FOUND., (Dec. 18, 2014) 
https://fragilex.org/support-and-resources/fragile-x-syndrome-and-autism-spectrum-disorder-
similarities-and-differences/ [https://perma.cc/9YPJ-QDEJ]. 
 96. See Real Stories from People Living with Fragile X Syndrome, CDC (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fxs/stories.html [https://perma.cc/2BKS-BNNV]. 
 97. See SOLOMON, supra note 89, at 275. 
 98. See generally A. Ganna et al., Large-Scale GWAS Reveals Insight into the Genetic Architecture of 
Same-Sex Sexual Behavior, 365 SCI. eeat7693 (Sept. 4, 2019) (explaining how two studies have 
“indicated that same-sex sexual behavior has a genetic component”).  
 99. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1235. 
 
 100. Neel Burton, When Homosexuality Stopped Being a Mental Disorder, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 
18, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hide-and-seek/201509/when-homosexuality-
stopped-being-mental-disorder [https://perma.cc/N9XG-KQFA]. 
 101. Ranna Parekh, What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria 
[https://perma.cc/HWC3-D69X]. 
 102. See Geoffrey L. Ream, What’s Unique About Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) 
Youth and Young Adult Suicides? Findings from the National Violent Death Reporting System, 64 J. 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 602, 602 (2019). I am mindful of the fact that, statistics aside, suggesting that 
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Another interesting example is that of the Belgian town of Geel, which 
has been embracing strangers with severe mental illness for over 700 years.103 
In Geel, those with psychiatric disorders are not treated or medicated; they are 
called guests or boarders, as opposed to patients.104 The eccentric behaviors of 
the guests are incorporated into society without fear or emotion.105 The Geel 
case study suggests that the label of “disease” is largely a social construct.106 In 
Geel, boarders become a part of society and life, such that any distinction 
between the boarders and nonboarders has blurred.107 Ultimately, Fragile X, 
Geel, and homosexuality are a few examples among many.108 The attitudes of 
society shift over time as data is gathered and synthesized, and it is possible that 
what society considers a disease today may not be classified as such in the future. 
b. Narrowing the Right 
As Enríquez notes, the line-drawing problem could arguably be solved by 
more carefully defining the right, as Glucksberg’s second prong requires. After 
all, conditions such as Tay-Sachs and Lesch-Nyhan syndrome are unlikely ever 
to be considered a part of the normal spectrum of diversity. At approximately 
six months of age, infants diagnosed with Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin 
deteriorating neurologically and physiologically. These infants display severe 
mental deficiencies and compulsive self-mutilation behaviors. Often, these 
babies must have their elbows placed in splints, their hands wrapped in gauze, 
and have all of their teeth extracted.109 There is, as of now, no cure for Lesch-
Nyhan syndrome, but the condition’s genetics are well understood.110 Instead of 
 
the LGBT population is more susceptible to suicide may be offensive to some. See DALE CARPENTER, 
FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 34 (2012). 
 103. Angus Chen, For Centuries a Small Town Has Embraced Strangers with Mental Illness, NPR (July 
1, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/01/484083305/for-centuries-a-small-
town-has-embraced-strangers-with-mental-illness [https://perma.cc/5Q9U-ZRRM]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Instead of viewing a boarder as an ill person—as an “other”—she is part of the spectrum of 
“mental differences” that exist within humanity. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Among these is Fragile X Syndrome, a likely target for CRISPR soon. See Foulkes et al., supra 
note 2, at 1377; see also Jamie Berke, How Do Deaf People View Themselves?, VERY WELL HEALTH (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://www.verywellhealth.com/deaf-culture-deaf-disabled-both-1048590 
[https://perma.cc/ER33-AFL4] (hashing out the debate as to whether deafness is or is not a disability) 
. ADHD is also on this list. See, e.g., Chuck Ruby, ADHD Is Not a Disorder, INT’L SOC’Y ETHICAL 
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY (Feb. 9, 2016), http://psychintegrity.org/1377-2/ [https://perma.cc/
538Z=AE2T] (“‘ADHD’ is not a condition or disorder. It is a descriptive label given to people who are 
not interested enough in a particular topic or an authority figure as they should be.”). 
 109. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
423, 473 (2011) [Cohen, Regulating Reproduction]. 
 110. Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, NIH: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Feb. 3, 2013), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/lesch-nyhan-syndrome.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PE7-TTUZ]. 
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defining the right as Enríquez has in his argument—at monogenic conditions 
to avoid the line-drawing problem—the line might be placed at conditions 
involving cognitive deficiencies so that the child would be born with an 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of no more than X or a life expectancy of no more 
than Y. This definition avoids the problem the Roe framework struggled with, 
which is that as the technology improved the lines drawn in Roe became 
unworkable.111 Monogenic conditions will never become polygenic, though 
science may one day be able to target polygenic conditions using CRISPR. And 
so, as in Roe, the lines Enríquez draws making access to CRISPR therapies 
targeting monogenic conditions fundamental, but excluding polygenic 
conditions because the science is not well understood, become unworkable. 
Using IQ or life expectancy as a benchmark, however, poses no such problem.112 
Because moving to define the right more carefully resolves the 
intractability problem, it is possible that the Court might reject the broad 
definition of the right to GGE for not being adequately careful.113 This 
rejection, considering Glucksberg’s first prong, seems reasonable given the fact 
that leaving open-ended the definition of burden, subject to change depending 
on societal context, is antithetical to providing a “careful description of the 
asserted right.”114 If we move to more clearly define the right, then we have 
solved the Glucksberg prong two problem while creating a Glucksberg prong one 
problem. That is, there is no tradition deeply rooted in history for editing out 
genes that cause a child to be born with an IQ of no more than X or a life 
expectancy of no more than Y. And it makes little sense for the Court to accept 
one definition of the right for the first prong, while analyzing Glucksberg’s 
second prong using a different definition of the right.115 
 
Children diagnosed with Tay-Sachs don’t fare much better. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 
109, at 473. 
 111. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 112. Concededly, it may be that one day the life expectancy of children with Tay-Sachs may exceed 
Y. But this is not a problem because then Tay-Sachs falls outside of the right, though the right remains 
unchanged. Based on this standard, all children who had Tay-Sachs edited out of their genome would 
have had a life expectancy of less than Y at the time of birth. There may still be some misgivings here, 
as the edited child’s life expectancy may have increased past Y during his lifetime. Because we are 
talking about germline genome editing here, Tay-Sachs will have also been edited out of that child’s 
future children, who more likely would have had a life expectancy greater than Y. Those children, 
however, would have otherwise never existed, so long as Y stays under reproductive age. In any case, 
it’s not a perfect line—and there are more problems with it than those I’ve raised here—but it is a 
better one. 
 113. See Ossareh, supra note 67, at 757. 
 114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting anything that would require the Court “to make the 
extremely subjective and excessively discretionary determination . . . is sufficiently repugnant to the 
notion of due process”). 
 115. This is, after all, exactly what the Court refused to do in Glucksberg. 521 U.S. at 702. 
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2.  Substantive Due Process and Value-Forming Characteristics 
Let’s assume, as some have suggested, that the Court’s opinion in Lawrence 
invites a more expansive fundamental rights analysis and that this more flexible 
analysis allows us to bypass the Glucksberg problem outlined above. In other 
words, that Lawrence spells the death of narrowly defined substantive due 
process rights.116 This conclusion is speculative,117 given that Lawrence does not 
ultimately recognize a fundamental right, makes use of the language in 
Glucksberg, and concludes by submitting the Texas statute to rational basis 
review.118 Further, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart119—a substantive due 
process case decided after Lawrence and with a majority opinion also authored 
by Justice Kennedy—adhered to the standards articulated in Glucksberg without 
mention of Lawrence.120 Even assuming the conclusion that Lawrence spells the 
end of narrowly defined rights is true, however, Lawrence itself then imposes a 
different limitation. 
As clarified by Lawrence, the concerns that underscore the Court’s 
decisions on the right to privacy revolve around shielding value-transmitting 
and value-forming relationships from the state’s control.121 And it is these 
concerns that are important for determining if a decision fits within a previously 
recognized, broadly defined right.122 That is, the level of generality that should 
be used in a constitutional analysis depends on whether the abstraction is 
representative of the actual tradition, as determined by whether the same 
concerns as those underlaying the Court’s prior holdings are present. Should 
those concerns not be the same, it’s more likely that the abstraction is nothing 
more than a mere concoction presented for purposes of litigation.123 
Unlike having a German-speaking child or having one’s children attend 
private schools, raising a disease-free child lacks the same traditional link to 
value formation. Certainly, a mother might need her child to speak German so 
 
 116. See Nancy Pham, Note, Choice v. Chance, The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human Germline 
Genetic Modification, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 133, 139–40 (2006) (“Some argue that Lawrence 
signals the death of the narrow approach to defining rights.”). 
 117. And taken to its logical extreme, it is also contrary to precedent. Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the 
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”). 
 118. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558, 578 (2003). 
 119. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 120. Calabresi, supra note 84, at 1518 (“I think the overwhelming majority of future substantive 
due process cases are going to be decided, as Gonzales was, with citation to Glucksberg and without 
reference to Lawrence.”). In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
of 2003. 550 U.S. at 124. 
 121. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 189. And if Lawrence spells the death of narrowly defined 
constitutional rights, then the Court’s cases from Meyer to Lawrence have to be understood as part of a 
single tradition, speaking to one broad fundamental right. 
 122. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 110 (1991). 
 123. See id. at 111 (“[T]he test should be whether the asserted level of generality provides an 
appropriate description of already-protected rights without reference to the newly-asserted rights.”). 
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that she can communicate with him and pass down cultural values and 
traditions. This may be the only way for her to fulfill a part of her development 
as a person. Through the relationship with her German-speaking child, she 
will—by virtue of the shared language—now be able to transmit her values and 
share in his experience. Likewise, a mother might want her child to attend 
private religious school because the child will pick up on certain values. These 
values are important to her as an individual and contribute to the formation of 
the value-transmitting parent-child relationship so central to the parent’s 
development. But, at least traditionally, there doesn’t exist a role for a disease-
free condition to contribute to the preservation of the value-transmitting 
relationship between parent and child. 
To the contrary, it has been suggested that engaging in GGE helps to 
deface the parent-child relationship. And as such, by recognizing constitutional 
protections for the decision to engage in GGE, the Court would not only fail 
to protect the value-forming and value-transmitting parent-child relationship 
but instead contribute to corrupting the ideal of parenthood.124 The use of these 
technologies makes procreation more akin to manufacturing, where the 
“manufacturer stands above [the product],” resulting in a process which is 
“profoundly dehumanizing, no matter how good the product.”125 If by finding 
that the right to privacy encompasses the right of a parent to use GGE 
technologies the Court would arguably be sanctioning the disfiguring of a 
relationship it had previously been concerned with protecting, we can assume 
the abstraction of the right to privacy in this case would not be representative 
of actual traditions. 
B. Limitations from Decisions Restricting Parental Autonomy 
To be sure, the Court could take a broader view of the intrinsic concerns 
in Lawrence. Arguably, if the concerns underlying Lawrence were about keeping 
the state from interfering with value-forming and value-transmitting 
relationships, then the state should be kept out of all central decisions involving 
parental autonomy. Because generally, no matter what decisions the parent is 
making for her child, the relationship itself is a value-forming and value-
transmitting one by definition. The actual values being transmitted are, to all 
intents and purposes, irrelevant. Even so, the Court—any limitations imposed 
 
 124. See Cohen, Best Interest supra note 63, at 1270 (“[Genetic modification] disfigures the relation 
between parent and child . . . .”) (quoting MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 
46 (2007)). 
 125. Id. at 1265 (quoting Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN 
CLONING 3, 39 (1998)). 
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by Lawrence and Glucksberg aside—has explicitly recognized that a parent’s 
constitutionally protected interests are not so expansive.126 
The Court has previously struck down a parent’s authority over her minor 
child’s abortion decisions,127 instructing that the familial relationship between 
parent and child is not beyond the state’s regulatory reach.128 Again, in Parham 
v. J.R.,129 despite siding with the parents, the Court noted that in certain 
circumstances a parent is not free to have “absolute and unreviewable 
discretion” to make medical decisions for her child.130 In Prince v. 
Massachusetts,131 the Court affirmed the conviction of a child’s legal guardian for 
violating a child labor law, holding that the state has broad authority over 
children’s activities and may lawfully restrict the parent’s control.132 As these 
cases illustrate, in decisions involving parental autonomy following Meyer and 
Pierce, the Court has not always been absolutely deferential to the parent. To 
determine when Meyer and Pierce—two load-bearing pillars of modern 
substantive due process—do support a claim for parental autonomy, the Court 
looks to how the allocation of decisionmaking power in the context at hand 
serves the parent, the child, and values central to the Constitution.133 
Indeed, it makes sense to rest the recognition of the right in parental 
autonomy cases on how the allocation of decisionmaking power affects those 
involved: although protections afforded to parental autonomy have deep roots 
in tradition, they are nonetheless unusual constitutional protections. They 
involve protecting one person’s control over another person—the parent’s 
control over the child.134 Even if the reasons for shielding parental autonomy 
from government interference are characterized as parent-centric, we can’t 
negate the fact that the parental decisions implicate control over a third party 
in the name of autonomy. Because of this idiosyncrasy,135 when the Court grants 
constitutional protection to a parent’s decisions involving her child, special 
attention is paid to three distinct interests typically served by protecting 
parental autonomy: (1) the parent’s interest in achieving fulfillment through 
 
 126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (“[T]he right has some extension to activities relating 
to marriage, . . . procreation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships . . . , and child rearing and 
education.” (emphasis added)) . 
 127. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983). 
 128. See Attanasio, supra note 1, at 1295. 
 129. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
 130. Id. at 604. 
 131. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 132. Id. at 166–67, 168, 170. 
 133. Developments in the Law—The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1353 (1980). 
 134. Id. at 1352–53. 
 135. See Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State (pt. 
2), 4 FAM. L.Q. 409, 410–11 (1970); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1353 (“If the 
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childrearing; (2) the child’s interest in having the decisionmaker be the one best 
suited to the task; and (3) the Constitution’s interest in diversity and 
pluralism.136 To determine the degree of protection that should be afforded to 
a certain parental right,137 a determination must be made about the extent to 
which each of these interests is served.138 
1.  The Parent’s Interest in Self-Fulfillment 
The argument for GGE above lays out the significance of the parent’s 
interest in self-fulfillment under the circumstances.139 In any case, the interests 
of the parent will always pull in favor of parental autonomy. Though the degree 
of control being afforded to the parent in this case is drastic—at issue is the 
(likely) irreversible manipulation of her child’s genetic code, the essence of his 
being.140 So the correlating degree of constitutional protection required will 
necessarily turn on how the interests of others involved are implicated.141 
2.  The Child’s Interest in the Allocation of the Decision 
A child has an interest in having the best-situated decisionmaker call the 
shots.142 At least for a subset of children in the GGE context, the Nonidentity 
Problem will always align the child’s interests with those of the parent. The 
Nonidentity Problem tells us that no matter how strongly, ex ante, the child’s 
interest in having the best decisionmaker available to him militates against 
unrestricted parental autonomy, the edited child’s alternative—ex post, once he 
is in a position to assert his interests—is to never have existed at all. Where the 
GGE intervention was a necessary condition for the child’s existence, and where 
the child is not destined to live a life not worth living, the child’s interest will 
always favor the parent as the best-suited decisionmaker.143 As it turns out, 
however, the effects of the Nonidentity Problem are more nuanced and affect 
only a subset of relevant scenarios. 
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a. Existing Embryos and False Nonidentity Problems 
A true Nonidentity Problem arises only when the edited child would 
otherwise not have existed.144 In a majority of scenarios, however, the 
Nonidentity Problem isn’t decisive when it comes to the child’s interest. Where 
the edited embryo would have been conceived in any case, a true Nonidentity 
Problem does not arise. In this scenario, the parent is informed that, without 
GGE intervention, her already conceived child will suffer from condition Q. 
Although Q may be a serious medical condition, Q is nonetheless compatible 
with life. But GGE could prevent condition Q from developing in the parent’s 
embryo.145 Under a traditional understanding of the Nonidentity Problem, 
whether or not GGE intervention takes place, the identity of the child with 
condition Q remains constant.146 The same is true if the child has not been 
conceived, but the availability of GGE interventions would have in no way 
influenced the parent’s decision to conceive. For purposes of the Nonidentity 
Problem’s framework, the child’s identity is the same pre- and post- 
intervention. And so, the child asserting his rights ex post is the same child 
whose interests, ex ante, opposed unrestricted parental autonomy. The child’s 
counterfactual here is to exist as himself with condition Q. The Nonidentity 
Problem, therefore, isn’t an obstacle to considering how parental autonomy 
serves at least some children’s interests in having the best-situated 
decisionmaker make the GGE decision. 
b. Roe and Fetal Rights 
But any maneuvering past the Nonidentity Problem drives the argument 
directly into the fetal rights obstacle embedded in Roe. The Supreme Court has 
explicitly rejected the proposition that an embryo should be considered 
human—a person under the Constitution—at conception.147 There is no dispute 
that the Court in Roe rhetorically denied fetal rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.148 The embryo to be edited exists at an even earlier developmental 
stage than the fetus in Roe. Although, unlike the fetus at issue in Roe—which 
will exist no more after the abortion is performed—the embryo at issue here 
will develop into a person as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. And that 
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person will have to move about the world with the GGE decision having “a real 
and lasting effect on his life.”149 
It is important to remember that in the context of parental autonomy 
decisions, the Court is concerned with a narrow interest: the child’s interest in 
having the best-situated decisionmaker making decisions.150 The issue is not 
that, to curtail parental autonomy, the fetus’s liberty interests must outweigh 
those of the parent. Rather, the parent’s liberty interests have usually been 
protected only where the protection would serve to further the child’s interest 
in having a most capable decisionmaker advocate for him. The dicta in Roe must 
be overcome to the extent that it would prohibit the Court from considering 
the interests of the future child at all. 
Here, there is strong indication that the child’s interests would support 
limiting parental autonomy.151 The parent’s particular familiarity with her child 
has little relevance in a medical context.152 Medical expertise will better situate 
a decisionmaker than the special relationship between parent and child.153 By 
virtue of being born a genetically engineered human, the child will also be 
irreversibly branded as an “other,” potentially compromising that child’s 
essential human dignity.154 The parent, however, in making the GGE decision 
is likely avoiding branding herself as an “other,” the parent of a “diseased” child. 
As such, there exists an inherent conflict between parent and child in the GGE 
decision. At best, the parent, having no medical expertise, is no better situated 
than the state to make the GGE choice. At worst, the parent is a conflicted 
decision-maker, unlikely to further the interests of her child. Therefore, in the 
category of cases where the Nonidentity Problem is not at issue, the child’s 
interests do not favor unrestricted parental autonomy. 
3.  The Constitution’s Stake in Diversity and Pluralism 
One final consideration is that where the Court has thwarted government 
intrusion into decisions central to parental autonomy, the parent’s autonomy 
has clearly helped to further the Constitution’s interest in safeguarding 
diversity and pluralism.155 Unrestricted parental autonomy, by splintering 
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childrearing decisions, helps prevent state-imposed orthodoxy, which the 
Constitution disfavors.156 In the medical context, scholars have noted that where 
the child’s interests do not favor unrestrained parental control, neither does the 
societal interest in diversity and pluralism.157 Government regulations of GGE 
technologies are unlike state-imposed restrictions on teaching foreign languages 
in that the former arguably prevents the standardization of children while the 
latter sanctions state-imposed orthodoxy. 
CRISPR’s scientific underpinnings are antithetical to an interest in 
diversity. Through the Human Genome Project, scientists developed for their 
use the equivalent of a standardized reference text.158 Following the mapping of 
the human genetic terrain, genome sequencing was then used to identify 
defective genes and correct genetic mistakes.159 This view of genetic differences 
as a textual error—deviations as a marker of a “genetic other”—reinforces a 
negative construction of disabilities and undervalues genetic diversity.160 The 
reference text developed through the Human Genome Project, after all, is 
anything but diverse: it was derived from samples of a few men of European 
origin.161 One of the most poignant critiques of research in genomics, moreover, 
is that the sample population from which data is collected to conduct clinical 
trials and Genome-Wide Association Studies lacks diversity.162 In short, the 
data being collected comes mostly from white, non-Hispanic participants, and 
new technologies and treatments are developed based on this unrepresentative 
sample.163 Any corrections made through GGE to edit out genetic abnormalities 
would therefore, in effect, be standardizing to a nondiverse mean. 
By using CRISPR to eliminate deviations from the unrepresentative 
reference text based on unrepresentative data, GGE is—at least to some 
extent—targeting diversity as genetic disease. Of course, genetic diversity is not 
exactly what comes to mind with mention of a pluralist society’s interest in 
diversity. But if we simply consider that some diversity of thought comes from 
diversity of experience, and that diversity of experience ultimately stems, at 
least in part, from biological diversity, genetic diversity and diversity of thought 
 
 156. Starr, supra note 155, at 195. 
 157. Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1356. 
 158. James C. Wilson, (Re)Writing the Genetic Body-Text: Disability, Textuality, and the Human 
Genome Project, CULTURAL CRITIQUE, Winter 2002, at 23, 26. 
 159. Id. at 25. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 26. 
 162. See Winnie W.S. Mak et al., Gender and Ethnic Diversity in NIMH-Funded Clinical Trials: 
Review of a Decade of Published Research, 34 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS. RES. 497, 497 (2007). 
 163. See Roseann E. Peterson et al., Genome-Wide Association Studies in Ancestrally Diverse 
Populations: Opportunities, Methods, Pitfalls, and Recommendations, 179 CELL, 589, 598 (2019); see also 
Clara C. Hildebrand & Jonathan M. Marron, Justice in CRISPR/Cas9 Research and Clinical Applications, 
20 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 826, 826–27 (2018). 
98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1549 (2020) 
1572 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
are inextricably linked. Certainly, there may be cases, as illustrated by the 
achondroplasia vignette above, where a parent would be applying GGE to select 
for diversity. In this context, it is enough to show that the Constitution’s 
interest in diversity and pluralism is not clearly served by allocating the 
decisionmaking to the parent alone. The diversity-based CRISPR critiques are 
enough to introduce some uncertainty. 
At minimum, the interests of the Constitution in diversity and pluralism 
are conceivably at risk of being disserved in the context of GGE.164 
Additionally, for at least a subset of circumstances, the child’s relevant interests 
are in no way served. As it has in cases past, this balance of interests should 
dissuade the Court from extending an unusual constitutional protection, a 
protection which affords one person control over another, to the GGE context. 
Limitations derived from Glucksberg, Lawrence, and other precedents 
counsel against recognizing a fundamental right to therapeutic GGE. 
Independently, prudential concerns offer more reasons for doing the same. 
III.  PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
More than any other justiciability doctrine, the judiciary’s self-imposed 
restraint requiring judicially manageable standards explicitly recognizes the gap 
between constitutional guarantees and judicially enforceable rights.165 
A. Intractable Line-Drawing and the Parents’ Parallel Rights 
So far, both the argument and the counterargument for GGE have 
discussed the right of a parent in the singular. But any one embryo would 
necessarily have two (maybe even three) parents.166 If a mother has a 
fundamental right to edit out a certain genetic profile in her embryo, it seems 
necessary to recognize a parallel right in the embryo’s other genetic parent(s) 
to keep the embryo’s genetic makeup intact, or vice versa.167 The parents’ rights 
would come to a point of intersection. And at their intersection, at minimum, 
the rights of all parents are no longer judicially manageable.168 Professor 
Laurence Tribe has addressed this issue in the context of embryo destruction, 
concluding there is no principled way for the Court to choose between the rights 
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of two similarly-situated parents.169 In other words, the Court would have a 
hard time fashioning a reliable standard for determining which parent’s 
constitutional rights should be protected at the expense of the other, similarly 
situated parents’. 
B. Institutional (In)competence & Science 
The Court’s lack of expertise and expressed hesitance in involving itself in 
issues of science and technology are worth emphasizing. As Enríquez himself 
aptly points out, there is no available framework, as of now, for satisfactorily 
addressing questions of science in law.170 The Court recognizes the challenges 
that complex scientific principles pose to legal scholars. Take for example the 
oral arguments for the Myriad Genetics case. Myriad involved complex questions 
about genetics and molecular biology.171 The Justices were exceedingly 
confused172 on important points. Beyond not understanding the science, Justice 
Scalia candidly admitted that he did not believe in facts that have been readily 
accepted by the scientific community for decades.173 And, in a frighteningly 
relevant context, there’s precedent for the Court making misguided decisions 
where the underpinning science at issue was not well understood by the Justices: 
Buck v. Bell.174 During the time Buck was decided, the eugenics movement, 
seeking to eradicate the feebleminded and other genetically inferior people from 
the American population, had gained huge momentum in the United States.175 
Among eugenics supporters was Oliver Wendell Holmes.176 Justice Holmes, 
writing for the majority, concluded by upholding a sterilization statute with the 
unfortunate remark: “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”177 Buck v. 
Bell has never been overruled.178 
As a matter of policy, the Court should refrain from basing decisions on 
scientific issues the institution isn’t competent to handle. 
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CONCLUSION 
GGE applications are no longer improbable hypotheticals. Genetically 
modified humans are, after all, now among us.179 When the decision to recognize 
a fundamental right to access GGE technology reaches the Supreme Court, the 
Court should adhere to its precedent in a delicate area, where “[g]uideposts for 
responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce and open-ended . . . . [And t]he 
doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires [the Court] to exercise the utmost care 
whenever [it is] asked to break new ground.”180 As such, the Court should refuse 
to recognize a fundamental right to GGE for health and therapeutic uses. 
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